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Abstract
This paper investigates the costs for firms of employing women full-time versus part-time
in terms of differential hourly wages. To this end, we use administrative matched employer-
employee data on the universe of female workers in Italy over 33 years and rely on regression
models that control for worker, firm, and job match fixed effects, in addition to several
worker-, job-, and firm-level time-varying factors. We find that, when a worker switches from
a full-time to a part-time contract within the same firm, she benefits from an increase in the
hourly wage. Over the last three decades, these wage premiums have significantly reduced,
remaining positive and significant up to 2015. We also find that the part-time premium
is pervasive and stable across many different labor market segments and independent of
workers’ intrinsic productivity levels. These and other findings appear to be compatible
with developments in wage bargaining institutions, whereby more generous conditions can
be accorded to part-timers. Coupled with the detrimental effect of part-time work on firm
productivity documented by Devicienti et al. (2018), our results contribute to explain why
firms are often unwilling to concede part-time positions to employees asking for them.
Keywords: Part-time/full-time wage differentials, wage bargaining institutions, multiple
fixed effects regressions, administrative matched employer-employee longitudinal data.
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1. Introduction
Many experts stress that part-time work is a valuable instrument of work-life balance since
it allows people to better conciliate work with private life needs (Eurofound and ILO, 2019;
Eurostat, 2009; OECD, 2017). However, both anecdotal and available statistical evidence
suggests that workers who wish to switch to a part-time work schedule often encounter the
resistance, if not the outright opposition, from their employer. A quick search on the Internet
confirms this: there are plenty of online forums where workers complain that employers do not
allow them to work a reduced number of hours. It is not unusual that workers, particularly
females, are forced to quit their jobs following the denied request to switch to a part-time
work arrangement. Accordingly, Gasparini et al. (2012) report that only about 30% of full-
time employees in the EU-15 feel that their employer would view their request to reduce
working hours favorably.
There might be several reasons why firms are typically not willing to accomplish the re-
quests of their workers to switch to a part-time contract. Communication and start-up costs
associated with part-time work as well as difficulties in optimally staffing part-time employ-
ees might impose efficiency losses on the organizational structure of firms. In a recent study,
we find that part-time work is indeed linked to significantly lower firm productivity and that
this result holds for different categories of firms and after accounting for a large number
of worker- and firm-level characteristics (Devicienti et al., 2018). If firms can compensate
for this productivity gap associated with part-time work by offering lower wages to part-
time contracts, they should be indifferent between employing workers full-time or part-time,
and thus fulfilling workers’ requests to switch to part-time arrangements. However, this is
typically unfeasible in most industrialized economies, where the law dictates that part-time
contracts must enjoy the same monetary (and non-monetary) benefits of comparable full-time
contracts. In some countries, such as Italy, the law even allows for more favorable treatment
to part-time contracts. The emergence of a zero or positive part-time/full-time wage differ-
ential, coupled with the lower productivity associated with part-time arrangements, would
then help to understand the firms’ reluctance to accommodate workers’ requests to switch
to part-time schedules. In this paper, we aim at understanding whether this happens. In
other words, we tackle the analysis from the firms’ viewpoint and aim at estimating whether
part-time schedules have a different cost, in terms of hourly wages, compared to full-time
arrangements.
To do so, we use a vast data set, which covers the universe of private-sector employees
in Italy over more than 30 years. This data set is based on administrative data from the
Italian Social Security System (INPS) and links each employee to the firm she works in,
thereby allowing to exploit rich longitudinal worker-, firm-, and job-level information. This
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information at multiple levels is crucial to assess the presence of any wage differentials
associated with part-time arrangements since a multitude of factors at these various levels
can simultaneously determine wages and part-time work status. We concentrate on the
impact of a change in the working time arrangements of the same worker within the same
firm. In synthesis, this allows removing any confounding effects due to unobserved fixed
worker, firm, and job-match heterogeneity. At the same time, we control for an ample
set of time-varying observable factors, which might also confound the effect. Particular
attention is devoted to controlling for the employee’s working history, with specific reference
to accumulated experience in the labor market, in part-time and full-time work. We also pay
attention to possible contemporaneous endogeneity stemming from maternity and employer
undergoing periods of economic crisis, which are likely to simultaneously influence a change
in the working schedule and wages.
In this study, we focus on females. This is for several reasons. First, females constitute
the vast majority of part-time workers. Second, we concentrate on females because they
represent the most relevant segment for the aims and policy implications of this paper.
Females are those that typically ask for (temporary) transitions into part-time work, often
to conciliate work with family commitments. A denied request to switch to a part-time
arrangement may entail withdrawal from work, with well-known long-lasting consequences
in terms of earnings and the possibility to successfully re-enter the labor market. Third, male
part-time work is a very heterogeneous phenomenon and, differently from what happens for
women, mostly involuntary (i.e., most part-time men work part-time while willing a full-
time position). Fourth, we concentrate on females for comparative purposes. As we will
discuss below, most studies examining part-time/full-time wage differentials have focused on
females.
Several papers have analyzed part-time/full-time wage differentials, but most of them
have investigated the issue from the workers’ viewpoint. These studies were mainly interested
in assessing the determinants of part-time/full-time wage differentials, and how the part-time
status influences future earnings and career trajectories of workers. Particular attention
has been devoted to gender issues, either by concentrating the analysis on women or by
juxtaposing part-time earnings differentials and gender wage gaps (Manning and Petrongolo,
2009; Matteazzi et al., 2018; Mumford and Smith, 2009; Pacelli et al., 2013); to the impact
of switching to a part-time contract on future earnings and career prospects of workers
(Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2011; Paul, 2016);
and to the presence of a possible heterogeneity of part-time wage differentials along the wage
distribution (Gallego Granados, 2019; Nightingale, 2019; Simon et al., 2017).
This paper contributes to the existing part-time literature in several ways. It is one of
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the few studies that explore the wage effect of switching to a part-time contract while at
the same employer. Moreover, the use of administrative data on the universe of workers
and firms over more than three decades allows us to explore the long-run dynamics of the
part-time/full-time wage differential for the universe of Italian workers, and to run separate
analyses on many different categories of workers and firms, based on, for instance, age,
migration status, parenthood, job duration, occupation, and the firm’s size, industry, and
location. The dimension of our data entails that, for each of these analyses, we can remove
confounding factors related to worker, firm, and match-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Furthermore, in order to explore the mechanisms at work, we investigate if effects vary
between short and long part-time work (as in Paul, 2016) and between switches from full-
time to part-time work and switches from part-time to full-time arrangements (as in Booth
and Wood, 2008, and Day and Rodgers, 2015). We also explore the relevance of mechanisms
related to workers’ commuting and differential rent-sharing by part-time status within the
firm.
Using longitudinal matched employer-employee data to estimate part-time/full-time wage
differentials in Spain, Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2011) are, to the best of our
knowledge, the only scholars controlling for both individual- and firm-level unobserved fixed
heterogeneity, as we do in this paper.1 They report significant part-time wage penalties for
female workers, which remain after controlling for individual and firm fixed heterogeneity,
and are particularly pronounced for temporary workers. Our estimates instead point to the
existence of pervasive wage premiums associated with part-time work schedules, which are
transversal to many different segments of the labor market. These and additional results
are compatible with part-time premiums stemming from the relatively higher protection
accorded to (female) part-time workers by unions and sectoral collective agreements.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the mechanisms
that can lead to a wage differential between part-time and full-time work schedules. Section
3 reviews the existing empirical literature on the part-time/full-time wage differential along
two main dimensions: estimation methods and cross-country evidence. Section 4 outlines our
empirical model, the type of effect that we identify, and its relation with previous empirical
works. Section 5 describes the data, Section 6 shows and discusses our results, and, finally,
Section 7 draws the implications of our findings and concludes.
1However, while we have data on the universe of Italian employees over 33 years, they use a 4% non-
stratified random sample of the population registered with the Spanish Social Security Administration in
2006, which amounts to a sample of about 76,000 individuals observed over the years 1996-2006.
4
2. Conceptual framework
There are several theoretical explanations as to why firms may pay full-timers different hourly
wages than part-timers.
A first mechanism relates to productivity differentials between the above two categories of
workers, which - absent wage rigidity - should be reflected in wage differentials. Part-timers
may be less productive than full-timers due to daily start-up costs, whereby the individual
productivity of labor is lower during the first hours of work and picks up only slowly during
the day (Barzel, 1973). Also, part-time work may impose firm-wide communication and
coordination costs that can be of detriment to the firm’s overall efficiency (Owen, 1978).
However, part-timers may also be more productive compared to full-timers if stress reductions
from working fewer hours offset the above-mentioned adverse effects (Moffitt, 1984; Tummers
and Woittiez, 1991). Overall, the existing evidence for Italy points to significant productivity
losses associated with part-time work arrangements (Devicienti et al., 2018).
A second set of mechanisms relates to the notion of compensating wage differentials.
Individuals requesting shifts to part-time arrangements (e.g., due to childcare duties) may
be willing to accept lower hourly wages in exchange for the possibility of working reduced
hours. If firms find it costly to arrange part-time schedules, part-time wage penalties arise
in equilibrium. Apart from lower productivity possibly associated with part-time work,
firms typically face fixed labor costs (e.g., hiring and training costs). These costs increase
proportionally with the number of employees rather than with hours worked, thus making
part-time work schedules relatively more expensive (Montgomery, 1988; Oi, 1962).
Alternatively, workers may require an increase in hourly wages to compensate for the
reduction in total labor earnings (and possibly consumption) associated with the reduction
in hours of work. Compensation for part-time schedules may also be required when workers
have to bear commuting costs, both in terms of time spent to reach the job location or because
they have to pay a fixed cost, such as a seasonal train/bus or parking ticket.2 Compensation
for part-time arrangements may also happen if part-timers are less likely than full-timers to
obtain non-wage benefits or other amenities at the workplace (as argued by Paul, 2016, and
Bardasi and Gornick, 2008). As we aim at understanding a firm’s resistance to conceding
part-time positions to their employees, compensating wage effects following switches from a
full-time to a part-time contract occurring within the same firm are of particular interest.
A third reason for differential hourly wages by part-time/full-time status is that part-
2Mulalic et al. (2014) have analyzed the effect of commuting distance on workers’ wages. Using the event
of firm relocations in Denmark as a quasi-natural experiment, they found that employers accord a wage
increase to their workers as compensation for higher commuting costs.
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timers may suffer from (statistical) discrimination, despite this is typically prohibited by law.
In Italy, as well as many other advanced industrialized countries, the legislation concerning
part-time work imposes strict rules against the discrimination of part-timers. In particular,
it dictates that part-time workers must enjoy the same monetary (e.g., wage, monetary
bonuses) and non-monetary (e.g., paid sick leave, parental leave) treatment of comparable
full-time workers according to a pro rata temporis principle.
Finally, collective bargaining may affect the ability of wages to reflect workers’ produc-
tivity. In many countries, including Italy, the law leaves sectoral collective agreements free
to dictate more favorable treatments for part-time workers. Individual- and firm-level bar-
gaining are often too weak to undo (and may even strengthen) the dispositions set by unions
at the industry level. On their part, unions might disproportionately defend the weaker
segments of the labor force, typically including (female) part-timers. If so, de-unionization
and wage decentralization - recently observed in many EU countries, and often advocated by
policy commentators - may associate with a deterioration of any wage privilege previously
associated with part-timers.
3. Previous empirical literature
The existing evidence on the presence of part-time/full-time wage differentials is mixed and
dependent on the type of data and estimation methods utilized. Many studies have focused
on cross-sectional surveys of workers, and have typically found wage penalties associated
with part-time work, which often remain after controlling for a series of individual-, firm-,
and job-level characteristics (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008; Elsayed et al., 2017; Hardoy and
Schøne, 2006; Jepsen et al., 2005; Manning and Petrongolo, 2009; Matteazzi et al., 2014;
Mumford and Smith, 2009). A typical result from these studies is that the part-time pay
penalty reduces significantly after taking into account occupational categories, pointing to
a crucial role of occupational segregation in explaining observed part-time wage penalties.
Other researchers have instead used individual longitudinal survey data (Booth and Wood,
2008; Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Day and Rodgers, 2015; Hirsh, 2005; Paul, 2016), and
found that part-time penalties significantly reduce, often disappear, and sometimes even
transform into part-time premiums once worker fixed effects are included in the regressions.
Therefore, unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g., differences in abilities and preferences
between workers typically holding part-time versus full-time contracts) also plays an essential
part in explaining observed part-time pay penalties (Paul, 2016).
Some studies have assessed part-time/full-time wage differentials distinguishing between
different types of part-time work, including working part-time with a few hours and more
extensive part-time work (Paul, 2016) or being in a fixed-term versus permanent job position
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(Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2011). Most relevantly for the present paper, some
scholars have looked at what happens when the change in the working time arrangement
is not accompanied by a simultaneous change of the employer (Day and Rodgers, 2015;
Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2011; Manning and Petrongolo, 2009). For instance,
Manning and Petrongolo (2009) have found that hourly earnings of women shifting from a
full-time to a part-time contract in the same firm remain virtually unchanged in a sample
of 90,000 British women observed in the period 2001-2003. In contrast, the raw part-time
wage gap is as high as 25% and reduces to 12.5% when individual-level characteristics are
controlled for and to 2.5% when also occupation categories are taken into account. Part-
time status and wages may thus also be related to firm and job-match specificities that,
if uncontrolled, can confound the estimated earnings differentials between part-time and
full-time working time arrangements.
Paul (2016) used survey data for German female workers over the period 1984-2011. The
study found evidence of a wage penalty for short part-timers (i.e., weekly working hours
between 5 and 15 hours) and a wage premium for long part-timers (i.e., weekly working
hours in the range of 15-35 hours), after controlling for individual-, firm-, and job-level
observable characteristics, individual-level fixed heterogeneity, and non-random switches to
part-time positions. Using Australian survey data for the period 2001-2004, Booth and
Wood (2008) have found that the wage differentials of (both male and female) part-timers
shift from negative to positive after controlling for individual-, firm-, and job-level observable
characteristics and unobserved individual fixed heterogeneity. Day and Rodgers (2015) have
recently updated the study by Booth and Wood (2008) using a 12-year panel survey, and
confirmed the presence of a premium for full-timers that switch to part-time work, but only
if the switch is within the same firm.3
Some papers have departed from estimating average effects and tested whether part-
time/full-time wage differentials vary across the wage distribution. Simon et al. (2017) have
performed quantile regressions using survey data for Spain and found that part-time work
tends to penalize low-qualified men located in the lower part of the wage distribution and
high-qualified women located in the upper part of the distribution. Gallego Granados (2019)
has instead found an opposite result from survey data on German women, whereby a part-
time wage penalty emerges at the lower end of the wage distribution and a premium at the
top of the distribution, while for workers that earn median wages they found no discernible
3Both Paul (2016) and Booth and Wood (2008) do not distinguish between changes in the working time
arrangement that occur within the same firm from switches that also involve a simultaneous change of the
employer.
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difference between part-time and full-time pay.4
There are also a few cross-country studies that report part-time premiums for some coun-
tries and penalties for others (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008; Matteazzi et al., 2014; O’Dorchai
et al., 2007; Pissarides et al., 2005).5 Like most of the single-country studies surveyed above,
these cross-country studies typically control for an ample set of covariates at the individual-,
firm-, and job-level (e.g., occupational segregation), and for non-random sorting into part-
time status using fully-specified parametric models with distributional assumptions.
As far as we know, the only estimates on part-time earnings differentials existing for Italy
come from these cross-country studies, and results are somewhat mixed. While Matteazzi
et al. (2014) and Pissarides et al. (2005) both point towards the presence of a wage premium,
Bardasi and Gornick (2008) and O’Dorchai et al. (2007) show evidence for pay penalties
associated with part-time work.
In particular, Matteazzi et al. (2014) have used survey data from the European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions for the year 2009 and conducted the analysis for
Italy on a sample of around 8,000 women aged 25-59. They found a significant (but small)
part-time premium. Pissarides et al. (2005) have used the European Community Household
Panel Survey for six annual waves (period 1994-1999) and performed their analysis for Italy
on a sample of around 7,000 women and men aged 16-64. They found significant and
substantial wage premiums for part-timers, both males and females. The study by Bardasi
and Gornick (2008) resorts to the Luxembourg Income Study data and uses a sample for
Italy of around 5,000 women aged 25-59 observed in the year 1995. It finds instead significant
wage penalties associated with part-time work. O’Dorchai et al. (2007) have resorted to the
European Structure of Earnings Survey for the year 1995 and conducted the analysis on
a sample of around 67,000 men employed in Italian private-sector firms with at least 10
workers. They have found significant wage penalties associated with male part-time work.
Notice that none of these studies on Italy use fixed-effects methods to control for unobserved
time-invariant individual and firm heterogeneity. Fixed-effect methods flexibly control for
non-random selection into part-time status without resorting to distributional assumptions,
and complement existing research based on fully-specified models.
Finally, using administrative matched employer-employee panel data on working careers
4This finding is in line with the one reported by Paul (2016). While Paul (2016) has distinguished
between short and long part-time work, Gallego Granados (2019) has compared low-pay and high-pay part-
time occupations. Both results are consistent with the view that part-time work is a very heterogeneous
phenomenon, possibly polarized between “good” and “bad” jobs.
5For women, a part-time pay premium has been observed in Sweden by Bardasi and Gornick (2008), and
in Austria and Italy by Matteazzi et al. (2014). For men, it has been observed in Denmark by O’Dorchai
et al. (2007), and in Italy, Austria, and Greece by Pissarides et al. (2005).
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(INPS-WHIP), Pacelli et al. (2013) have investigated the presence of a “motherhood” wage
penalty among Italian women over the period 1989-2003. Interestingly, they have found that
a shift from a full-time to a part-time contract after becoming mothers is not associated with
a reduction of the hourly wage, while a wage gap is observed if women are still working as
full-timers after childbirth. They interpret the results by arguing that the high protection
accorded to part-time jobs in Italy was preventing the emergence of any “motherhood-
related” part-time wage gap.6
4. Empirical model and identification issues
As discussed in the previous sections, the part-time/full-time wage differential might be the
result of many intervening factors: holding a contract stipulating a reduced number of hours
per se is only one of them (Paul, 2016). To motivate the empirical model used below, clarify
the nature of the estimated parameters, and discuss identification issues, it helps to quickly
recap the many confounders at play.
A relevant fraction of the raw part-time wage penalty is accounted for by observable
personal characteristics of the worker, such as his/her human capital (e.g., education and
experience) or other individual characteristics (e.g., children). While these factors have a
substantial effect on wages, at the same time, they are strong determinants of the decision
to work part-time. For instance, part-time jobs are often associated with positions for low-
educated or low-experienced individuals, which are associated with lower wages. Similarly,
limitations to mobility and constrained schedules due to family commitments might force
individuals to take on less favorable jobs, which might be part-time. However, once these
observable personal characteristics of the worker are accounted for, part-time workers are
still found to earn substantially less than full-timers.
Other dimensions that contribute to explaining a substantial fraction of the part-time
wage penalty are job characteristics, including occupation, and workplace characteristics.
There is significant job segregation associated with part-time work: low-skilled positions and
fixed-term contracts are significantly more likely to be associated with part-time contracts
compared to high-skilled positions and permanent contracts. Female segregation at the
workplace also contributes significantly to explaining the part-time wage penalty (Mumford
and Smith, 2009).
As reviewed earlier, a first strand of the literature has estimated part-time/full-time
6The WHIP data set is similar to ours, but refer to a much shorter, earlier period; more importantly, it
is a 1:12 random sample from the worker universe. This makes the estimation of models with both worker
and firm fixed effects virtually unfeasible.
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wage differentials by controlling for as many observable differences as possible, including
individual, job, and workplace characteristics (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008; Ermisch and
Wright, 1993; Matteazzi et al., 2014; Manning and Petrongolo, 2009; Mumford and Smith,
2009; Wolf, 2002). These studies estimate a “pure” effect of part-time work, insofar as they
hold constant observable aspects that differ between part-time and full-time work. However,
they are not necessarily able to identify the causal effect of holding a part-time contract.
Other factors not attributable to working a reduced number of hours per se can determine
the wage differential.
Some scholars have stressed the role of differences in work histories between part-time
and full-time workers (Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Fernández-Kranz et al., 2015). Being
employed part-time in previous years might lead to accumulating substantially less experience
and (firm-specific) human capital compared to having worked full-time, thereby implying
lower wages of part-time workers who have been holding part-time contracts for a long time.
A second set of studies have acknowledged that part-time workers might be different com-
pared to full-time workers on time-invariant unobservable individual characteristics, such as
ability, commitment to work, and energy. Such unobserved fixed heterogeneity explains a
relevant part of the part-time penalty, which often disappears (or even transforms into a
premium) once it is controlled for (Booth and Wood, 2008; Hirsh, 2005; Connolly and Gre-
gory, 2009; Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2011). As highlighted by Paul (2016),
while accounting for individual fixed effects appears essential to get closer to an estimate of
the causal effect of part-time work, it also entails that such effect is estimated exclusively on
those that switch from a full-time to a part-time position (or vice versa).
It is also crucial to account for unobserved fixed firm heterogeneity, including corporate
culture, degree of firm-level collective bargaining, or corporate social responsibility, which
might affect wages offered by the firm and its use of part-time contracts (Fernández-Kranz
and Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2011). Accounting for unobserved fixed firm characteristics - beyond
worker fixed effects - implies estimating the wage differential on those workers that switch
from full-time to part-time work (or vice versa) while employed by the same firm, but
ensures that the impact of part-time work abstracts from any confounding effects due to a
contemporaneous change of employer.
However, after having controlled for both individual and firm fixed effects, some time-
varying factors can still intervene in the decision (either by the employee or the employer)
to switch working time arrangement, and, at the same time, be correlated with earnings
changes (i.e., contemporaneous endogeneity; see also Aaronson and French, 2004, and Paul,
2016).
First, it is essential to control for possible changes in the job contract that might occur
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contemporaneously with the change in the working time arrangement. They include changes
in the type of occupation (i.e., occupational upgrading)7 and duration of the work contract
(i.e., passing from fixed-term to permanent contract). Having a child is another typical and
relevant event (Connolly and Gregory, 2009; Paul, 2016).8 Similarly, the firm’s decision to
transform some of the workers’ contracts from full-time to part-time can also be not random
and time-varying. A typical situation in which contemporaneous endogeneity might emerge
is when the firm experiences a period of crisis, during which it might convert selected groups
of employees to part-time work schedules and contextually reduce their wages.
Given the above discussion, we estimate the following wage regression:
ln(wijt) = αi + φj + µij + βPTijt + γXijt + εijt. (1)
The dependent variable, wijt, is the hourly wage of worker i working in firm j in year t. The
term αi is a worker fixed effect, capturing the time-invariant worker heterogeneity. The term
φj is a firm fixed effect, capturing the time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The term µij is a
firm-worker match fixed effect, capturing time-invariant match heterogeneity (on this, see
below). Our regressor of interest is PTijt. It is a dummy variable for the part-time contract.
It is 0 if the worker holds a full-time contract and 1 if the worker holds a part-time contract.
As highlighted by the subscripts of PTijt, we can observe the part-time status of a given
worker across years and firms. Importantly, this means that we know whether a worker
switches from a full-time to a part-time contract (or vice versa) while at the same employer,
or after changing employer. The vector Xijt collects a variety of worker- and firm-level
characteristics included as controls. Depending on the specifications, they can comprise
the worker’s migration status, age, occupation, contract duration (i.e., permanent versus
temporary), tenure in the firm, total work experience, total experience in part-time work,
the firm’s size, sector of economic activity, and region, and year fixed effects.9 Depending on
the specifications, the vector Xijt will also include controls for maternity events and demand
shocks at the firm-level, or at the level of the local labor market, to account for potential
problems of contemporaneous endogeneity outlined above. Finally, εijt is the residual of the
regression. Our parameter of interest is β, which measures the percentage wage differential
7Formal occupational downgrading within the same firm is illegal in Italy. In practice, the switch to a
part-time arrangement might be associated with a professional deskilling, which cannot be observed from
administrative data.
8It often happens that women ask for a reduction of working hours after having a child, which might have
wage effects other than those related to the switch to a part-time contract.
9Note that we cannot explicitly account for workers’ education as our data do not provide this information.
However, this should not represent an issue as education is mostly time-invariant for those who are employed,
and, therefore, largely accounted for by worker fixed effects (on this, see also Connolly and Gregory, 2009).
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between part-timers and full-timers that emerge net of the controls listed earlier.
We estimate Equation (1) by OLS using within-spell variation.10 Not only does this entail
the removal of worker and firm fixed effects. It implies that we are also controlling for any
fixed unobserved heterogeneity related to the job match (i.e., the employer-employee match).
Match-specific fixed heterogeneity (embedded in µij) may include skills and knowledge of
the worker that are particularly relevant to the firm, which likely influence both the wage
and part-time status of the match. Crucially, removing worker, firm, and match fixed effects
means that we estimate the part-time/full-time wage differential by using wage variation
arising from switches from full-time to part-time contracts (or vice versa) of the same worker
in the same firm.
In sum, we obtain an estimate of the part-time/full-time wage differential that is nei-
ther driven by selection into specific jobs and due to particular worker and firm observable
characteristics (including work histories), nor by unobserved individual, firm, and job match
fixed heterogeneity. Since we also control for contemporaneous endogeneity due to adverse
conditions experienced by the firm, on the one hand, and entry into motherhood, on the
other hand, the estimated β identifies the causal effect of part-time work if one assumes
that no other time-varying factors intervene in the decision (either by the firm or by the
employee) to switch from a full-time to a part-time contract or vice versa.
5. Data
We use administrative data of the Italian Social Security System (INPS), which collect labor
market histories for the period 1983-2015 of each employee working for at least one day in any
private-sector firm in Italy. In the data, workers and firms are assigned unique identifiers,
allowing us to track them longitudinally. It is also known in which firm a given worker is
employed at each point in time. Hence, we have a longitudinal matched employer-employee
data set on the universe of Italian private-sector employees over more than 30 years.
Worker information includes basic demographic characteristics: the worker’s gender, age,
and place of birth. Although imperfectly, we can also recover information related to mater-
nity periods by exploiting INPS information on maternity leaves. As concerns information
of the worker’s job, we have data on yearly gross wages, number of days worked over the cal-
endar year, type of occupation, contract duration (fixed-term versus open-ended contract),
and whether the worker holds a part-time or full-time contract. All these variables are
time-varying, that is, they can change from one year to the next, while at the same firm or
following a change in employer.
10We refer to worker-firm combinations as “spells”.
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Differently from most of the papers reviewed in Section 3, which base the distinction
between employees working full-time and part-time by looking at how workers describe their
employment situation or by establishing ex ante a specific hours threshold, in our data
set, the contract itself neatly identifies the part-time status. Therefore, we can precisely
separate part-timers from full-timers without resorting to arbitrary hours cut-offs. Thanks
to the panel dimension of the data set, we can also compute the workers’ experience in the
labor market, as well as their experience in part-time work. Similarly, we can reconstruct
the workers’ tenure in the firm.
As for firms, we have information on general characteristics such as their location and
industry. We can also construct variables related to the firms’ workforce, such as their use of
part-time work. Finally, INPS information on incorporated businesses could be matched to
the financial information contained, for the same firms, in the AIDA data set (Bureau Van
Dijk). The matching procedure was carried out using unique fiscal identifiers by the INPS
data warehouse. This allowed us to retrieve firm-level financial information (e.g., revenues
or value-added) from the yearly balance-sheets that firms are mandated to maintain and
deposit within the system of the Chambers of Commerce (see Section 6 below).11
Although we do not directly observe working hours, we can precisely measure a worker’s
contractual hourly wage at each point in time. The hours of work stipulated in a full-time
contract contain a sector, firm, and occupation-specific components. We have controls for
each of these components in equation (1). We then need information on the number of hours
stipulated by each part-time contract. The INPS data provides us with this information.
Specifically, we know the exact proportion of hours of work stipulated by each part-time
contract when compared to the corresponding contract for a full-time position, that is, a
full-time position held in the same sector, firm, and occupation.12 Hence, our regression
analyses allow us to estimate how the contractual hourly wage of a worker changes when
moving from a part-time to a full-time position, or vice versa.
We conduct a basic cleaning of the data. First, we focus on individuals aged 15-64 (i.e.,
those within the typical working age). Second, we drop jobs with less than 16 paid weeks
in a year in order to capture workers with a minimum of labor-market attachment.13 Third,
11The AIDA data set includes balance-sheet information on the universe of non-financial incorporated
businesses. Since non-incorporated firms are not required to file detailed balance-sheets, they are not present
in AIDA. Hence, analyses where we exploit balance-sheet information rely on part-time/full-time switches
that occur within firms included in the INPS-AIDA matched data.
12This information is obtained from the INPS variable called “settimane utili”.
13Notice that this restriction applies only to yearly observations. Therefore, if an individual works less
than 16 weeks in a given year, we do not remove the entire block of panel observations corresponding to that
individual. For robustness, we carried out several estimations for the case in which we do not apply this
restriction and observed very similar results.
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to minimize measurement error in wages, we drop the top and bottom 1% in each yearly
wage distribution, as well as any job reporting a number of paid days over the theoretical
maximum in a year (equal to 312 days). Finally, for workers holding multiple jobs in the
calendar year, we select the one with the highest wage.14
In our empirical analysis, we focus on the more recent, post-crisis period 2009-2015. The
total number of observations in that period is 33,088,421. As shown in the bottom part of
Table 1, there are over 1,5 million of women who switch from full-time to part-time contracts
or vice versa within this period. As many as 792,079 of these switches occur within the same
firm. These 792,079 observations are those on which we identify our effect of interest, that is,
when we remove both worker and firm (and, consequently, match) fixed effects. As one can
see from Table A.1 in Appendix A, many of these switches are from full-time to part-time
contracts (501,787), whereas switches from part-time to full-time arrangements are relatively
less frequent (290,292 occurrences).
Worldwide, part-time jobs are typically held by women, and Italy is no exception. Ac-
cording to our data, about 42% of female employees were working part-time in the 2009-2015
period. As Table 2 shows, the proportion of part-timers among females steadily increased
during our 33-year span. The share of part-timers among males was instead much lower:
on average, only about 11% in the 2009-2015 period. However, as for females, it steadily
increased throughout our observation window (see Table B.1 in Appendix B).15
Finally, Table 6 reports the number of workers’ transitions into part-time or full-time
work differentiating among a variety of labor market segments, and Table A.2 in Appendix A
reports summary statistics on observable worker-, job-, and firm-level characteristics for the
different subsets of switchers. These two tables give additional information on the switchers.
Switches within the same firm appear to be more likely in “good jobs” or “better matches”.
They are more preponderant among workers in prime-age or older-age categories, among
natives, permanent workers, white-collar workers or managers, and workers in firms located
in more prosperous areas (North-East and North-West), as well as those employed in medium
and large companies. Among those who change working time arrangements within the same
firm, average experience and tenure are higher. Finally, among those who switch from
14As an alternative, we randomly selected one job in case of multiple job holdings in the year, but this did
not produce any significant change in our results.
15We have compared such statistics with data from the Labor Force Survey for Italy. While roughly com-
parable, the shares of part-time workers are systematically higher in INPS data compared to LFS data. Such
discrepancy is likely linked to different population coverages in the two data sources. Most relevantly, the
LFS also includes public-sector employees, where part-time work is substantially less widespread compared
to the private sector. For instance, according to the Italian State General Accounting Department, the share
of part-timers among females was only around 7% in the public sector in 2006. Moreover, the LFS is based
on self-reported information, whereby workers might misreport information on their work contract.
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full-time to part-time work within the same firm, the proportion of women experiencing
a maternity-leave event in the year is the highest, coherently with the fact that entering




Table 1 shows our main results derived from the estimation of Equation (1). Here we
concentrate on the 2009-2015 period. Following the discussion in Section 4, we present
different versions of the estimated part-time/full-time wage differentials, which gradually
insert controls. All the estimations report robust standard errors clustered at the worker
and firm (i.e., at the job match) level.
The first row of the table shows that there is a raw part-time/full-time wage differential
of -0.233. This is consistent with the other studies in the part-time literature, whereby
substantial row part-time pay gaps are reported in many industrialized countries. In Model
2, we control for a series of worker-, firm-, and job-level observable characteristics, and
year fixed effects. As for worker- and job-level controls, we include a cubic polynomial
for the worker’s age, a dummy for foreign-born workers, dummies for contract duration
(i.e., permanent versus temporary), and dummies for occupation (divided into three classes:
blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, and manager). As concerns firm-level controls, we
include dummies for firm size (6 classes), industry (2-digit ATECO-2007 classification), and
region (20 dummies). The wage penalty associated with part-time arrangements reduces to
about 10%. In accordance with previous studies, accounting for observed worker-, job-, and
firm-level characteristics is essential to net out any effect due to selection into specific jobs
and of particular categories of workers and firms into part-time work.
Since unobserved fixed firm heterogeneity is likely to confound the effect, in Model 3, we
add firm fixed effects. The estimated part-time penalty reduces further to 4%, thus pointing
to the importance of netting out any wage effect due to unobserved firm specificities (e.g.,
differences in firm wage policies, firm-level bargaining, or corporate culture). Models with
firm-fixed effects compare workers who share the same working environment; they, however,
fail to adequately recognize that co-workers holding part-time instead of full-time contracts
may be inherently different. In Model 4, we instead control for worker - and not firm - unob-
16Gathering this information is crucial for the robustness checks aimed at ensuring that results are not
driven by selection bias and to explore the mechanisms behind. We thank two anonymous referees for having
raised these issues.
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served fixed heterogeneity. The part-time penalty transforms into a statistically significant
premium, equal to 1.9%. Unobserved differences between workers typically holding part-
time as opposed to full-time positions are thus crucial to be controlled for. Put together, the
results from Models 3 and 4 tell us that both firm and worker unobserved heterogeneities
are critical confounding factors. In Model 5, we estimate a version of Equation 1, which,
in addition to time-varying controls of Model 2, removes both firm and worker fixed effects.
The estimate shows that part-time contracts are associated with 4.6% higher hourly wages
compared with full-time contracts.
Workers’ labor market histories might also contribute to confounding the estimated part-
time/full-time wage differential. In Model 6, beyond worker and firm fixed effects and ob-
servable characteristics, we add controls for the worker’s tenure and tenure squared. In
Model 7, we further add controls for total labor market experience and its square.17 Both
models confirm a part-time premium just under 5%. In Model 8, we further insert a control
to explicitly account for experience in part-time work, measured as the number of years with
a part-time contract since the first observation in the INPS data set. Again, the estimated
part-time/full-time differential is stable (4.8%).
In Section 2, we have pointed out that contemporaneous endogeneity can still hinder the
identification of the effect of interest. In particular, we see two factors as particularly relevant:
maternity and firm-level shocks. In Model 9, we include a dummy variable indicating whether
the worker has been on maternity leave in the current year, which would capture as neatly
as possible the event of childbirth. The estimated part-time/full-time differential is still
positive and significant, at 3.9%. In Model 10, we control for firm-level shocks by resorting
to information on the firms’ yearly balance sheets obtained from the AIDA data set (i.e.,
here we use the matched INPS-AIDA data set on non-financial incorporated companies).
Productivity shocks are proxied by the firm-level value added per employee.18 The estimated
part-time differential in the INPS-AIDA sample of incorporated businesses and their workers
is still positive and significant, at 3.0%.
After removing any confounding effects related to selection of part-time contracts into
specific occupations and due to particular worker, job, and firm characteristics (including
employees’ work history), and after controlling for worker, firm, and match unobserved
fixed heterogeneity and contemporaneous endogeneity stemming from maternity and firm-
level shocks, it emerges that part-time contracts are associated with a higher hourly wage
compared with full-time contracts. This differential is in the range of 3 to 5% and is always
17Tenure is measured as the number of years the employee works in the firm, whereas total experience in
the labor market is measured as the number of years since the first job (as observed in the INPS data).
18As an alternative, we considered revenues per worker, with little changes in the results.
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statistically significant. Furthermore, the evolution of the estimated wage differential to
additional controls - from a raw part-time penalty of 23.3% to a significant part-time premium
- indicates that the wage effect of part-time contracts per se is indeed mixed up with a large
variety of confounding effects, which is crucial to net out.
Table 2 shows the evolution of the part-time/full-time wage differential over our 33-year
span. From now on, we present estimates with the same set of controls in Model 8 of Table
1, that is, with worker, firm, and match fixed effects, together with time-varying worker-,
firm-, and job-level controls including the full set of variables related to the employee’s work
history.19 Female part-timers experienced wage premia throughout our observation window.
The difference was high in the early periods and constantly decreased over time, passing
from as much as 32.7% in the 1983-1987 period - when only 3.2% of female workers held
part-time contracts - to 4.7% in the most recent 2009-2015 span.20
6.2. Robustness I: contractual versus actual hours
A notable feature of our data is the possibility to control for a large set of observable and
unobservable worker-, firm-, and match-specific wage determinants. However, a potential
limitation is that we do not observe actual hours of work. Only a few matched employer-
employee data sets include information on actual hours worked at the individual level. When
present, however, this information is typically more seriously contaminated by measurement
errors than earnings data drawn from social security sources. In the following, we take
various steps to provide an assessment of how unobserved variation in actual hours worked
might impact on the estimated part-time wage premium.
While our data allow us to account for variation in the number of hours formally stip-
ulated (ex-ante) by the part-time contract, they cannot account for (ex-post) variation in
the actual number of hours worked by both full-timers and part-timers, for instance, due to
contingent local- or firm-level economic conditions. As any overtime payments are included
in the numerator of our earnings measure, a potential issue arises as to whether unobserved
overtime or any other “extra” hours are differentially affected for part-timers and full-timers
by business-cycle conditions or firm-level shocks.21
19For these and the following additional estimates, we also experimented with specifications in Models 9
and 10 of Table 1 and obtained unchanged results.
20Even though this paper focuses on women, we report some general estimates for males. In Table B.1 in
Appendix B the picture is somewhat different from what emerges for women. While men experienced signif-
icant, yet decreasing, part-time premiums up to the early 2000s, in more recent years, the wage differential
disappeared.
21Having data on contractual versus actual working hours would have allowed computing imputed actual
working hours based on observable worker characteristics, as in Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas
(2011). In this method, however, workers with the same contractual hours and observable characteristics
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A related issue arises concerning involuntary part-time work, defined as a situation where
the worker would prefer to work more hours, but she is only offered a part-time job. In-
voluntary part-timers are more prevalent in a slack labor market, with high unemployment.
Somebody who may have to involuntarily switch to a part-time job, as a coping strategy to
avoid losing her job, is likely to suffer from a lower hourly wage because of his/her reduced
bargaining power. Alternatively, the same switch may entail an increase in the unit wage if
compensating wage differential considerations prevail, that is, if the higher hourly wage is a
compensation for the reduced number of hours, softening the drop in total labor income.
The concerns related to unobserved variation in hours should arguably be more relevant
when the local economy, the sector, or the firm is affected by adverse demand shocks, and
when the firm is less bound by formal practices and enforcement of labor contracts. To
investigate the practical relevance of such concerns, we follow four strategies. First, we
interact the dummy for part-time status with the local unemployment rate. Second, we
look at the dynamics in revenues at a fine sectoral level to identify the subset of firms facing
adverse demand shocks and for which variations in worked hours and switches to involuntary
part-time work may have been more likely to occur. Third, we try to identify the subset of
firms that have raised more intensively their use of part-time labor from one year to the next.
When an unusual share of a firm’s workforce switches from a full-time to a part-time position
in any given year, this might indicate that the firm is facing a negative demand shock, and
the switch to part-time work is demand-driven, that is, it is involuntary for the workers.
Fourth, we explore part-time/full-time wage differentials in specific subgroups of workers
where fraudulent practices of underreporting working hours of part-timers are unlikely.22
The results of these analyses are collected in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
In Table 3, we find that the part-time premium is reduced in the presence of high regional
unemployment, as shown by the negative interaction term.23 When a region undergoes a
are imputed the same actual hours, thereby disregarding idiosyncrasies in the firm’s demand shocks, which
are a crucial reason why there might emerge discrepancies between actual and contractual hours among
part-timers.
22Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2011) report that the practice of underreporting working hours
for part-timers is widespread in Spain. We have tried to directly assess whether this was the case for Italy.
We have checked several surveys on Italian workers, including the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the Time Use
Survey (TUS), and the European Working Condition Survey (EWCS). Unfortunately, there are no variables
available to us that make it possible to directly observe whether part-time workers systematically work more
hours than the hours stipulated by their contracts. However, some indirect evidence suggests that, in Italy,
the practice of differential underreporting of working hours by part-time status might not be a significant
issue. The ratio of actual hours worked by part-timers and full-timers computed on the LFS is virtually the
same compared to the share of contractual hours worked by part-timers and full-timers in the INPS data.
23In this case, we focus on the 2005-2015 period rather than the 2009-2015 period to exploit variation in
regional unemployment rates in pre- and post-Great Recession years.
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favorable business cycle, and unemployment is low, hours of work and overtime payments
are typically higher. The estimated part-time premium may be partly related to a greater
variation of hours worked among part-timers in regions with high labor demand. However,
the magnitude of this effect is negligible: the estimates imply that the part-time premium
is 0.0399 with an unemployment rate of 3.7% (10th percentile in the distribution of unem-
ployment) and falls to 0.0397 when unemployment is at 13.7% (90th percentile).
In the first panel of Table 4, we split the sample according to whether the job is held
in a firm experiencing a large - as opposed to a small - change in the sectoral product
demand.24 A large (small) shock is defined as being above (below) the median yearly change
in the real (log) revenues at the sectoral level, defined using 5-digit ATECO-2007 industry
classification. The estimated part-time premium is hardly sensitive to the size of the industry
product demand shocks, again suggesting that variation in unobserved hours of work does
not drive our results.
In the second panel of Table 4, we proxy a firm’s demand situation by relying on firm-
level variation in its use of part-time labor. We compute, for each firm, indicators capturing
variation in the intensity of part-time work among the firm’s workforce (e.g., any switch
in the number of hours contractually defined by the workers’ labor contracts).25 Then, we
separately estimate part-time/full-time wage differentials on the sub-sample of firms where
the one-year lagged change in the firm-level use of part-time work is above the 90th median
change in the sample. We also fit a similar model on the sub-sample of firms with a smaller
increase in the part-time intensity, which we set at the 50th percentile in the distribution of
the part-time intensity change in the overall sample. We rely on the lagged firm-level change
to exclude that this measure is simply mechanically picking up the current switch in the
part-time status of worker i, that is, PTijt in Equation (1). Moreover, to make the firm-level
change in part-time intensity more meaningful, we limit this analysis to firms with at least
15 employees. Consistently with the results discussed earlier, we do not find any sizeable
difference in the estimated part-time premiums in these two sub-samples.
In Table 5, we report our reference estimate of part-time/full-time wage differentials in
two specific sub-samples where the practice of differential underreporting of working hours
by part-time status is unlikely.26 In particular, we have enough within-firm switchers to run
24As here demand shocks are defined as industry-specific, we can rely on the entire INPS data set, con-
taining both incorporated and non-incorporated businesses, rather than on the smaller INPS-AIDA data set
that we need to use when examining the relevance of firm-level demand shocks.
25We do so by computing the firm-level change in the ratio between two INPS variables: the number of
“equivalent weeks” and the number of paid weeks.
26It should be noticed that, while off-the-book payments are not uncommon in Italy, they are typically not
recorded in administrative data, as the latter cover regular wage payments in jobs for which the employer
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our preferred econometric specification even in the narrowly-defined cells made of workers
who are prime-age (we further isolate workers aged 35-45 and 45-50), native, blue-collar, with
a permanent contract, working in large firms, in the manufacturing sector, and the North-
West of Italy. These are arguably the typical contexts where the combination of strong
unions’ presence, managerial practices, and the more prevalent civic and pro-law cultural
traits (e.g., compared to the South of the country) make the monitoring and enforcement
of labor contracts more likely and, conversely, misreporting or other informal practices less
widespread. Even in these specific cells, estimates point to a significantly positive, near to
the average value, part-time premium.
Overall, the bulk of the evidence reported in this section weighs against the concern that
variation in unobserved actual hours of work may play any significant role in our estimates.
6.3. Robustness II: selection and heterogeneity
While controlling for worker, firm, and match fixed effects is crucial to obtain a more robust
estimate of the actual part-time/full-time wage differential, it also entails that the wage effect
of part-time contracts is identified on the specific sample of workers who change working time
arrangement within the same firm, thereby causing possible selection bias. As highlighted
in Section 5, those who switch working time arrangements within the same firm may be
typically associated with “good jobs” (e.g., prime-age, native-born, white-collar, permanent
workers). Changes in working time arrangements with the same employer might thus be
more likely granted to workers who are “important” for the firm, for instance, those with
good employer-employee matches. Similarly, often women ask for a switch to a part-time
contract following maternity, and those who see their requests fulfilled might be those more
productive and strongly attached to the labor market. Observed part-time premiums might
thus be driven, at least in part, by these selection issues.
In the following, we pursue a variety of robustness checks to explore the relevance of
these selection concerns. First, we estimate part-time/full-time wage differentials in many
different subgroups of workers based on available observable worker-, firm-, and job-level
characteristics. We then explore the part-time wage effect for workers with different degrees
of tenure in the firm and experience in the labor market, which - albeit imperfectly - reflect
the “importance” of the worker for the employer. We check for differentiated effects by
degree of experience in part-time work, which might command wage changes at the moment
of the switch. Resorting to INPS information on maternity leaves, we also investigate part-
time/full-time differentials by maternity status. Finally, we more directly tackle the issue of
pays social security contributions. Hence, in principle our wage variable is not affected by this type of
underreporting practices.
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selection by unobservable worker ability by partitioning workers in terms of proxies of these
abilities, obtained before-hand through AKM-style estimates of worker fixed effects (Abowd
et al., 1999) from workers’ histories before 2009. All these robustness checks are possible
thanks to the large dimension of our data, which allows us to investigate how wages differ
between full-time and part-time contracts for various - even narrowly-defined - groups of
workers.
As in Table 1, here we focus on the more recent 2009-2015 period. The results are
collected in Tables from 6 to 9.
In Table 6, we re-estimated Model 8 of Table 1 separately for 22 different categories of
workers. We begin by splitting the sample by workers’ age groups (rows 1 to 4 of Table 6).
The motivations for undertaking part-time work might differ along the life cycle, particularly
in consideration of family commitments and circumstances. We then look at whether the
inclusion/exclusion of specific groups of workers, such as foreign-born or workers with tempo-
rary contracts, might have any detectable impact on our results, possibly on account of their
lower bargaining power (rows 5 to 8). Next, we split the sample according to three major
occupation groups (blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and managers), once again to
document the existence of any differential part-time premium related to the specificities of
these occupational profiles (rows 9 to 11).27 We then proceed by considering the sub-sample
of workers employed in firms of different sizes, which might also differently use and reward
part-time work (rows 12 to 16). For similar reasons, we split the sample according to whether
the job is held into a manufacturing or service firm (rows 17 and 18). Finally, recognizing the
large territorial disparities that characterize the country under consideration, we also look
at the existence of any substantial differences in the wage differential by part-time status in
different macro-areas (North-East, North-West, Center, and South of Italy, rows 19 to 22).
A casual look at the table reveals that a positive part-time wage premium is found in any of
the considered partitions and that it is always largely statistically significant. What is more
notable is that the estimated part-time premium varies extremely little across the groups,
although many of them might be regarded as structurally different in terms of preferences,
endowments, and constraints. A part-time premium that is virtually invariant across so many
observable characteristics provides an indirect indication that a similar premium would be
found were it possible to partition the sample according to unobservable characteristics.
In Table 7, we re-estimated Model 8 of Table 1 for split samples by degree of tenure,
experience, and experience in part-time work. We split the sample between high-tenure and
low-tenure workers as those above and below median workers’ tenure. Similarly, we divide
27Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to observe more detailed occupational groups.
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high-experienced and low-experienced workers as those above and below median workers’
experience. Finally, we divide the sample between workers with no experience in part-time
work or some experience in part-time work. As for the other subgroups in Table 6, in this
case, too, it emerges a significantly positive part-time/full-time wage differential. Again, the
estimated premium is very stable and in line with the average effect, reflecting the part-time
premium is essentially invariant to employees’ work history and possible selection concerns
due to switches granted to “more important” workers.
In Table 8, we run separate regressions based on women’s maternity status. We split the
sample between women who have never been on maternity leave during the 2005-2015 period
and women who have been at least once on maternity leave during the same period. Although
indirectly, this captures the presence of young children in the household. The results show
two things. First, a significantly positive part-time premium emerges for both categories of
women. Notably, it is 3.2% - slightly lower than the average estimate - on women who did not
experience maternity in recent years, indicating that selection concerns related to maternity
highlighted above do not have a major role in our results. Second, a substantially higher
part-time premium is found for those who experienced maternity, equal to 8.1%. While this
might be linked to more productive women asking and being granted a switch to part-time
arrangements following maternity, it is also consistent with more generous legal provisions
accorded to part-time mothers (see the discussion below on this).
Finally, Table 9 presents the estimated part-time/full-time differentials separately by
AKM worker effects. This is a more direct way to check whether the observed part-time
premium could be driven by “better workers” being more likely to ask (and be granted)
switches to part-time contracts. Using the method in Abowd et al. (1999), we have first
estimated worker effects from AKM regressions over the period 2005-2009, whereby wage
regressions with worker and firm fixed effects are used to estimate workers’ earning potentials
depurated from firm-specific wage components (e.g., firm specificities in wage policies). This
worker effect is commonly used as a proxy for the underlying individual productivity of the
worker. We then merged the estimated AKM effects on the 2009-2015 portion of the sample.
On the merged data, we then estimated the part-time/full-time wage differential for low-
and high-productivity workers, corresponding to the bottom and top 25th percentiles of the
AKM worker effects distribution, respectively. As one can see from the table, a significant
part-time premium - in line with the average effect - again emerges in both cases, even in
the opposite direction compared to what selection issues would entail. A slightly higher
part-time premium is indeed found in association with less productive workers (5.2% versus
3.4%). This more direct check suggests that selection related to workers’ (unobservable)
22
productivity is not driving our results.28
In sum, the separate analyses by many population subgroups point to a substantial uni-
formity of the estimated part-time premium across all subgroups. Even for employees with
different observed work histories (tenure, experience, and experience in part-time), the es-
timated part-time premium is very similar. A part-time premium emerges regardless of
maternity status and individual productivity levels. Overall, this points to the fact that
selection issues do not have any significant role in explaining the observed part-time pre-
mium.29
6.4. Mechanisms
In this subsection, we explore possible mechanisms behind the observed part-time premium.
The numerous robustness checks presented earlier point to a part-time premium neither
driven by variation in unobserved actual hours of work nor by selection issues. What emerges
instead is a pervasive premium across all segments of the labor market. Such pervasiveness
of part-time premiums must then be rooted in something that affects the worker population
across the board.
The protective nature of legal provisions associated with part-time contracts - whereby
sectoral- and firm-level collective agreements are allowed to grant more generous economic
treatments to part-timers-, the functioning of the Italian labor market, and, above all, its
system and practices of industrial relations seem the key culprits. The Italian labor market
features a relatively high amount of wage rigidities, mostly owing to the prevalent role of
sector- and firm-level collective bargaining (e.g., Devicienti et al., 2019). A form of rigidity
that is particularly relevant to our context is the presence of wage components (e.g., bonuses
and other monetary benefits) that are distributed in absolute amounts (i.e., non-proportional
to hours worked). This is partly due to the egalitarian wage policies typically pursued by
unions and their efforts to protect the weaker segments of the labor market, including women
on part-time work. Some wage components bargained at the individual level, or unilaterally
28Table A.3 in Appendix A reports the results for the probability of changing the working time arrangement
within the same firm (first panel) and switching from a full-time to a part-time contract within the same firm
(second panel) by AKM worker effects deciles. As one can see from the table, there is no detected pattern
that high-productivity workers have higher switching probabilities. While being sometimes significant, the
coefficients are very small in magnitude (they range between +0.0007 and -0.0069). This suggests that
changes in working time arrangements within the same firm (i.e., those on which we identify the part-
time/full-time wage differential) are essentially independent of workers’ intrinsic productivity levels.
29Notably, we do not detect part-time penalties in any of these subgroups, even among the most disad-
vantaged segments of the labor market. In particular, a part-time premium - even higher than the average
- also emerges for foreign-born and temporary workers. This finding is in sharp contrast with the one re-
ported for Spain by Fernández-Kranz and Rodŕıguez-Planas (2011), whereby a part-time penalty is found
for temporary workers once individual and firm fixed effects are removed.
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granted by employers, may also be not entirely proportional to hours. Even small amounts of
bonuses paid in absolute (i.e., quasi-fixed) amounts would end up favoring workers switching
to part-time contracts.
We pursue three types of analyses that corroborate the empirical relevance of such a
mechanism. First, higher benefits associated with part-time contracts due to legal provisions
should be reversible, that is, should be strictly linked to the work contract. Therefore, one
would expect that a switch from a full-time to a part-time contract should have a roughly
similar, but opposite in sign, effect compared with the reverse switch from a part-time to a
full-time arrangement. Second, if these more generous conditions associated with part-time
contracts materialize in absolute amounts, switches to a short part-time schedule should
command a higher premium than switches to a long part-time schedule. Third, rent-sharing
within the firm should also favor part-time workers. This, too, is to be expected if at
least some of the productivity-related bonuses are distributed to the firm’s workforce non-
proportionally to hours worked. Tables 10, 11, and 12 provide some first evidence that these
mechanisms are at play. As usual, all these estimates include the same set of controls in
Model 8 of Table 1, thereby presenting within-spell estimates.
Table 10 shows the wage effect of the two possible directions of switches: from full-time to
part-time work and from part-time to full-time work. The estimated wage impact of a switch
to part-time work is significantly positive (3.0%), whereas the reverse switch from part-time
to full-time is negative and significant at any conventional level (-1.4%). In Table 11, we have
first differentiated between short (defined as below 15 hours per week) and long part-time
work (more than 15 hours per week). We have then adopted a more fine categorization and
differentiated between short (again defined as below 15 hours per week), medium (between 15
and 28 hours), and long part-time work (above 28 hours). The results show that a significant
part-time premium emerges in all these cases. However, the highest premium is associated
with short part-time work (13.4%), which decreases to 6.1% in medium part-time work, and
2.3% in long part-time contracts.
Finally, Table 12 shows results concerning within-firm rent-sharing effects. We leverage
the empirical literature on rent-haring (e.g., Card et al., 2014) and run regressions to investi-
gate how firms distribute firm-level productivity shocks among their full-time and part-time
workers. Here, we use the INPS-AIDA matched data set, where information on each firm’s
yearly balance-sheets is available. Specifically, we estimate a version of Equation (1) that
beyond controlling for the firm-level productivity, defined as the firm’s yearly value added
per worker, also includes its interaction with the part-time dummy. The significant and
positive interaction coefficient suggests that firm-level productivity shocks are distributed to
workers in quasi-fixed amounts (i.e., productivity-related wage bonuses are non-proportional
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to hours), thus favoring part-time workers. We also experimented with measures of a firm’s
quasi-rent per worker as in (Card et al., 2014), defined as value added per worker net of the
opportunity cost of labor and capital.30 The results were very similar.
As discussed earlier, a possible explanation of observed part-time premiums might be
related to compensating-differential mechanisms. Those relating to commuting costs are a
typical example, whereby a part-time premium emerge to compensate for the higher weight
of commuting costs in reduced working time schedules. In Table 13, we have verified such a
mechanism by exploring part-time/full-time differentials based on the workers’ commuting
status. We have identified workers as commuters (non-commuters) if their municipality of
residence is different from (equal to) the municipality where the job is located. We experi-
mented with the exclusion of the major Italian cities for this exercise, with little differences
for the results. As one can see from the table, there are no discernible differences in part-time
premiums by commuting status. It is even slightly higher among non-commuters than com-
muters (4.8% versus 4.5%). Compensating-differential mechanisms related to commuting
thus do not seem to play any significant role in explaining the observed part-time premium.
Other forms of compensating differentials are still possible. However, one would expect them
to be differently relevant to the various subgroups of the worker population, which might be
characterized by different preferences, endowments, and constraints. However, as discussed
earlier, we find little evidence that the wage premium is heterogeneous across subgroups.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have used matched employer-employee data on the universe of Italian
private-sector female employees over 33 years and analyzed the costs for employers, in terms
of wage differentials, of transforming a work contract from full-time to part-time. Our
research aim motivated from the fact - both reported in official statistics and by anecdotal
evidence - that employers are often reluctant to concede switches to part-time arrangements.
Assessing the reasons behind such reluctance required estimating a part-time/full-time wage
differential that came as close as possible to the effect of working reduced hours per se, as
depurated as possible from potential confounding effects.
We therefore estimated part-time/full-time wage differentials by eliminating worker, firm,
and match fixed effects while controlling for a large number of worker-, firm-, and job-level
time-varying characteristics, including employees’ work history. We also controlled for non-
30The opportunity cost of labor is defined as the average industry by local labor market wage where the
worker is employed. The cost of capital is obtained after applying an Italian estimate of the user’s cost of
capital to the stock of fixed assets reconstructed with the perpetual inventory methods. See (Card et al.,
2014) for the details.
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random changes in working time arrangements due to maternity and local-, sectoral-, and
firm-level demand/productivity shocks. We have conducted a large variety of robustness
checks aimed at addressing two major concerns, namely, the fact that we did not observe
ex post variations in actual hours of work and selection issues. We finally pursued several
analyses to better gauge mechanisms behind the observed results. In particular, by match-
ing balance-sheet information from the AIDA data set, we were able to control for critical
firm-side events such as productivity/demand shocks and to explore the presence of rent-
sharing dynamics associated with part-time contracts, thus shedding new light on potential
mechanisms for the part-time wage premium.
The results point to significant and pervasive part-time premiums for females, which,
while declining, persist until recent years. The separate analyses by many population sub-
groups analyzed point to a substantial uniformity of the estimated premium across all sub-
groups. Even for workers with different observed work histories (in relation to tenure, ex-
perience, and experience in part-time), the estimated part-time premium was very similar.
The same happened when we partitioned workers according to proxies of their productivity
levels. While a somewhat higher part-time premium was found in association with mater-
nity, a significant part-time premium nevertheless emerged also for women not experiencing
childbirth. The part-time premium is not irreversible, but symmetrically linked to the tran-
sition: there is a premium in the switch from full-time to part-time work and a penalty
in the switch from part-time to full-time work. A significant part-time premium emerges
irrespectively of the type of part-time work schedule. Notably, part-time work with short
hours is associated with a substantially higher premium compared to part-time work with
extended hours. Finally, it appears that rent-sharing dynamics favor part-timers, who end
up receiving a slightly higher share of the rents generated at their employers compared with
full-timers.
What could drive these results? The Italian labor market features a relatively high
amount of wage rigidities, mostly owing to the prevalent role of sector- and firm-level col-
lective bargaining (Devicienti et al., 2019). In particular, while the Italian labor legislation
dictates that part-timers must receive the same monetary and non-monetary treatments as
comparable full-timers, it also explicitly allows sectoral- and firm-level agreements to provide
more generous economic treatments to part-timers (Matteazzi et al., 2014). Reversible pre-
miums, strictly linked to the work contract, are coherent with the part-time premium being
commanded by institutional dynamics. Such a pervasiveness in the economy provides further
support to the view that the observed part-time wage premiums are likely rooted in the insti-
tutions and practices that, across the board, characterize the country’s system of industrial
relations and wage bargaining. Furthermore, the high part-time premium associated with
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maternity is in line with the Italian labor legislation, whereby legal provisions concerning
part-time work are particularly generous with part-time mothers (Pacelli et al., 2013). De-
clining part-time premiums are coherent with developments in wage bargaining institutions.
Starting from the mid-1990s, the Italian labor market underwent a constant (if slow) trend
towards a general liberalization and modernization, aimed at removing labor market rigidi-
ties, thereby improving the connection of wages to underlying workers’ productivity and the
overall allocative role of wages. Gradually over time, sectoral collective bargaining may have
incorporated these tendencies also in the case of part-time work. However, even nowadays,
unions try to protect what are seen as weak segments of the labor force. That these groups
typically include part-time women (especially mothers) is in line with our findings that a
part-time wage premium is still observed for females, especially after childbirth.
A common form of labor market rigidity, whereby part-time premiums emerge, is the
presence of wage components, such as bonuses and other monetary gratifications, that are
distributed in fixed amounts, that is, not proportionally to hours worked. Some wage com-
ponents bargained at the firm-level, or unilaterally granted by employers, may also be not
entirely proportional to hours, thereby favoring workers switching to part-time contracts.
Higher premiums associated with short part-time contracts as well as rent-sharing dynamics
favoring part-timers are indications that these mechanisms are also at play.
Our paper does not claim that these are the only or even the primary channels. Our
more limited objective is to show that these specific channels have a role and contribute to
the detected wage premium of part-time workers. We have also explored the existence of
compensating-differential mechanisms related to work commuting, but these did not appear
to have any detectable bearing on the observed part-time premium. Of course, other forms
of compensating differentials are still possible. However, one would expect them to be
differently relevant to the various subgroups of the population, which might be characterized
by different preferences and constraints. However, the little evidence that the wage premium
is heterogeneous across subgroups seems to suggest that such mechanisms might not play a
significant role in explaining observed part-time premiums. Other channels, possibly related
to structural changes in the demand and supply of part-time jobs, might have also been
at play. While not having tested them directly, we could not exclude that - beyond the
“institutional explanation” - the interplay between demand and supply could have influenced
the evolution of part-time/full-time wage differentials in past and recent years.
In sum, the higher wage costs associated with part-time work, coupled with its detri-
mental effect on firm productivity that we documented elsewhere (Devicienti et al., 2018),
contributes to explaining the firms’ reluctance to concede part-time positions to employees
asking for them.
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There are some important policy implications from these findings. Tax reliefs may be
useful to overcome the firms’ double disincentive (productivity losses and higher labor costs)
to offer part-time positions. These rebates could be targeted to people in real need (e.g.,
involved in childcare or educational commitments), namely people who would voluntarily
switch to a part-time position, were they given the option. Also, institutional reforms making
wages more aligned to workers’ productivity may contribute to raising the number of people
successfully obtaining part-time positions when asking for them - a hitherto unnoticed benefit
from such reforms.
The mechanisms that we have highlighted may matter also for the part-time/full-time
differentials estimated in other countries and should be further investigated by future re-
search, possibly relying on data sets with rich information on both the worker and the firm
side. On the one hand, a consensus has not yet been reached on whether a premium or
a penalty prevails in which country and under which institutional circumstances. On the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Estimated part-time/full-time wage differential and po-
tential variation in hours worked related to local labor market
conditions. Female workers. Period: 2005-2015
Part-time work +0.040***
(0.0002)
Regional unemployment rate −0.002***
(0.0000)
Part-time work ∗ regional unemployment rate −0.0001***
(0.0000)
Observations: 49,419,633
Source: INPS data; years: 2005-2015
This regression includes the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. For all the rest, see
the footnote of Table 1.
Table 4: Estimated part-time/full-time wage differential and potential
variation in hours worked related to sectoral and firm-level demand
shocks. Female workers. Period: 2009-2015.
Firms below/above median change in log revenues at 5-digit sectoral level
Firms below median change Firms above median change
Part-time work +0.044*** (0.0002) [16,022,953] +0.048*** (0.0002) [16,036,935]
Firms with high or very high lagged increase in firm-level share of part-time workers
Firms above 50th percentile change Firms above 90th percentile change
Part-time work +0.046*** (0.0004) [8,407,245] +0.038*** (0.0012) [1,174,132]
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run on split
samples. In square brackets, the number of observations. For all the rest, see the footnote of
Table 1.
Table 5: Estimated part-time/full-time wage differential in contexts with
likely low discrepancy between part-time contractual and actual hours.
Female workers. Period: 2009-2015
Context Part-time/full-time
wage differential (β)
Workers aged (35-45], native-born, with a permanent contract,
blue-collar, in firms with >250 employees, located in North-West,
operating in manufacturing sector
0.061*** (0.0052) [48,916]
Workers aged (45-50], native-born, with a permanent contract,
blue-collar, in firms with >250 employees, located in North-West,
operating in manufacturing sector
0.047*** (0.0079) [24,648]
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run on split
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































High-tenure +0.044*** (0.0002) 16,605,422
Low-tenure +0.049*** (0.0002) 16,482,999
High-experience +0.045*** (0.0002) 16,622,534
Low-experience +0.051*** (0.0002) 16,465,887
No experience in part-time work +0.059*** (0.0002) 13,973,040
Some experience in part-time work +0.039*** (0.0002) 19,115,381
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run
on split samples. High- and low-tenure workers are defined as those above and below
median workers’ tenure, respectively. High- and low-experienced workers are defined as
those above and below median workers’ experience. “No experience in part-time work”
and “some experience in part-time work” are computed using the amount of experience
in part-time work accumulated by 2005 (or by the first panel observation after that year).
For all the rest, see the footnote of Table 1.





Never on maternity leave +0.032*** (0.0001) 24,595,481
At least once on maternity leave +0.081*** (0.0003) 8,242,278
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run on
split samples. “Never on maternity leave” and “at least once on maternity leave” refer to
period 2005-2015. Therefore, the first status implies that the worker has never been on
maternity leave between 2005 and 2015, whereas the second status means that the worker
has been at least once on maternity leave in that time period. For all the rest, see the
footnote of Table 1.





Bottom 25th percentile AKM worker effects +0.052*** (0.0003) 6,402,957
Top 25th percentile AKM worker effects +0.034*** (0.0003) 6,440,373
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run on split
samples. AKM worker effects are derived from AKM regressions with two-way fixed effects
computed over the period 2005-2009. For all the rest, see the footnote of Table 1.
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Table 10: Switches from full-time to part-time work versus switches
from part-time to full-time work. Female workers. Period: 2009-
2015
Direction of switch Part-time/full-
time wage differ-
ential (β)
Switch from full-time to part-time work +0.030*** (0.0002)
Switch from part-time to full-time work −0.014*** (0.0002)
Observations: 33,088,421
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
The regression includes the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. For all the rest, see the
footnote of Table 1.
Table 11: Short versus long part-time work. Female workers. Pe-
riod: 2009-2015




Short part-time work (less than 15 hours per week) +0.121*** (0.0003)
Long part-time work (more than 15 hours per week) +0.043*** (0.0001)
Model 2
Short part-time work (less than 15 hours per week) +0.134*** (0.0003)
Medium part-time work (between 15 and 28 hours per week) +0.061*** (0.0002)
Long part-time work (more than 28 hours per week) +0.023*** (0.0002)
Observations: 33,088,421
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. For all the rest, see the
footnote of Table 1.
Table 12: Rent-sharing. Female workers. Period: 2009-2015
Part-time work +0.010*** (0.0018)
(log) Value added per worker in the firm +0.022*** (0.0001)
Part-time work ∗ (log) value added per worker in the firm +0.003*** (0.0002)
Observations: 18,728,046
Source: INPS-AIDA data; years: 2009-2015
The regression includes the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. For all the rest, see the
footnote of Table 1.
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Not commuter (city of residence is the
same as city where the job is located)
+0.048*** (0.0002) 13,963,314
Commuter (city of residence is not the
same as city where the job is located)
+0.045*** (0.0001) 19,125,107
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. All regressions are run on
split samples. For all the rest, see the footnote of Table 1.
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Appendices
A. Identifying observations and selection issues
Table A.1: Observations used to identify part-time/full-time wage differential






















Pooled OLS 33,088,421 13,966,248 19,122,173 - - -
Worker fixed effects (all
switches)
1,500,855 900,866 599,989 95.5% 93.5% 96.9%
Worker, firm, and match
fixed effects (switches
within the same firm)
792,079 501,787 290,292 47.2% 44.3% 51.6%
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
* In the case of worker fixed effects or worker, firm, and match fixed effects, this is the number of workers
who switch from full-time to part-time work.
** In the case of worker fixed effects or worker, firm, and match fixed effects, this is the number of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Switching probability by AKM worker effects. Female
workers. Period: 2009-2015
Dependent variable: switcher FT/PT or PT/FT within the same firm
AKM worker effects - 2nd decile −0.0019*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 3rd decile −0.0014*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 4th decile −0.0003 (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 5th decile +0.0003 (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 6th decile +0.0007*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 7th decile +0.0003 (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 8th decile −0.0012*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 9th decile −0.0040*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 10th decile −0.0069*** (0.0002)
Observations: 26,268,852
Dependent variable: switcher FT/PT within the same firm
AKM worker effects - 2nd decile −0.0018*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 3rd decile −0.0015*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 4th decile −0.0009*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 5th decile −0.0003** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 6th decile +0.0000 (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 7th decile +0.0001 (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 8th decile −0.0004** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 9th decile −0.0017*** (0.0002)
AKM worker effects - 10th decile −0.0039*** (0.0002)
Observations: 26,268,852
Source: INPS data; years: 2009-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1, except for worker and firm
fixed effects, which are not included. Note that AKM worker effects are time-invariant. All
regressions are run on split samples. AKM worker effects are derived from AKM regressions
with two-way fixed effects computed over the period 2005-2009. For all the rest, see the
footnote of Table 1.
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B. Male workers
Table B.1: Evolution of estimated part-time/full-time wage differential and







1983-1987 +0.169*** 0.3% 25,047,046
(0.0002)
1985-1989 +0.137*** 0.6% 25,578,351
(0.0006)
1988-1993 +0.105*** 1.0% 32,904,218
(0.0004)
1992-1997 +0.053*** 2.1% 32,080,120
(0.0003)
1996-2001 +0.039*** 3.2% 34,433,755
(0.0003)
2000-2005 +0.027*** 4.1% 38,267,854
(0.0002)
2004-2009 −0.001*** 6.6% 40,115,889
(0.0002)
2009-2015 −0.000 n.s. 11.0% 45,787,468
(0.0001)
Source: INPS data; years: 1983-2015
All regressions include the same controls of Model 8, Table 1. “n.s.” denotes non-significance at the
10% level. For all the rest, see the footnote of Table 1.
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